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Abstract: Artificial intelligence is part of our daily lives. Whether working as 
taxi drivers, financial analysts, or airport security, computers are taking over a 
growing number of tasks once performed by people. As this occurs, computers 
will also cause the injuries inevitably associated with these activities. Accidents 
happen, and now computer-generated accidents happen. The recent fatality 
caused by Tesla’s autonomous driving software is just one example in a long 
series of “computer-generated torts.” 
Yet hysteria over such injuries is misplaced. In fact, machines are, or at least 
have the potential to be, substantially safer than people. Self-driving cars will 
cause accidents, but they will cause fewer accidents than human drivers. Because 
automation will result in substantial safety benefits, tort law should encourage 
its adoption as a means of accident prevention. 
Under current legal frameworks, manufacturers (and retailers) of computer 
tortfeasors are likely strictly responsible for their harms. This article argues that 
where a manufacturer can show that an autonomous computer, robot, or machine 
is safer than a reasonable person, the manufacturer should be liable in negligence 
rather than strict liability. The negligence test would focus on the computer’s act 
instead of its design, and in a sense, it would treat a computer tortfeasor as a 
person rather than a product. Negligence-based liability would create a powerful 
incentive to automate when doing so would reduce accidents, and it would 
continue to reward manufactures for improving safety. 
In fact, principles of harm avoidance suggest that once computers become safer 
than people, human tortfeasors should no longer be judged against the standard 
of the hypothetical reasonable person that has been employed for hundreds of 
years. Rather, individuals should be measured against computers. To appropriate 
the immortal words of Justice Holmes, we are all “hasty and awkward” 
compared to the reasonable computer.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
An automation revolution is coming, and it is going to be hugely disruptive.1 Ever cheaper, 
faster, and more sophisticated computers are now able to do the work of people in a wide variety of 
fields and on an unprecedented scale. They may do this at a fraction of the cost of existing workers, 
and in some instances, they already outperform their human competition.2 Today’s automation is 
not limited to manual labor; modern machines are already diagnosing disease,3 conducting legal 
due diligence,4 and providing translation services.5 For better or worse, automation is the way of 
the future—the economics are simply too compelling for any other outcome.6 But what of the 
injuries these automatons will inevitably cause? What happens when a machine fails to diagnose a 
cancer, ignores an incriminating email, or inadvertently starts a war?7 How should the law respond 
to computer-generated torts? 
                                                 
1 See generally, JAMES MANYIKA, ET AL., DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: ADVANCES THAT WILL TRANSFORM LIFE, 
BUSINESS, AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2013) (a report by the McKinsey Global Institute arguing the disruption 
caused by artificial intelligence will, “happ[en] ten times faster and at 300 times the scale, or roughly 3,000 times the 
impact” of the Industrial Revolution). 
2 See, e.g., Carl Benedikt Frey and Michael A. Osborne, The Future of Employment: How susceptible are Jobs to 
Computerisation? Oxford Martin Programme on Technology and Employment, Sept., 2013 (reporting in a seminal 
paper that 47% of American workers are at high risk of automation and stating that, “recent developments in machine 
learning will put a substantial share of employment, across a wide range of occupations, at risk in the near future.”).  
3 Roger Parloff, Why Deep Learning is Already Changing Your Life, Fortune, Sept. 28, 2016, http://fortune.com/ai-
artificial-intelligence-deep-machine-learning/. Several artificial intelligence systems are already capable of automating 
medical diagnosis. Id. For instance, Freenome has a system for diagnosing cancer from blood samples that is 
competitive with pathologists. See id; see also, Freenome Home Page, http://www.freenome.com.  
4 Jane Croft, Legal firms unleash office automatons, Financial Times, May 16, 2016, 
https://www.ft.com/content/19807d3e-1765-11e6-9d98-00386a18e39d (discussing various software programs that can 
outperform attorneys and paralegals in document review). Cf. Dana Remus and Frank S. Levy, Can Robots Be 
Lawyers? Computers, Lawyers, and the Practice of Law, Dec. 30, 2015, available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2701092 (arguing that artificial intelligence will refocus rather than replace attorneys). 
5 Yonghui Wu, et al., Google’s Neural Machine Translation System: Bridging the Gap between Human and Machine 
Translation, Sept. 26, 2016, available at https://arxiv.org/abs/1609.08144. Google now claims its Google Neural 
Machine Translation system is approaching human-level translation accuracy. Id. 
6 See, e.g., Deloitte. FROM BRAWN TO BRAINS: THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY ON JOBS IN THE UK, AT 4 (2015) available 
at https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/uk/Documents/Growth/deloitte-uk-insights-from-brawns-to-
brain.pdf (study results suggesting that every nation and region of the UK has benefitted from automation, and that 
automation has resulted in £140 billion to the UK’s economy in new wages).   
7 See, e.g., Fiona Macdonald, The Greatest Mistranslations Ever, BBC, Feb. 2, 2015, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/culture/story/20150202-the-greatest-mistranslations-ever (describing some of the unfortunate 
outcomes associated with mistranslation).  
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Tort law has answers to these questions based on a system of common law that has evolved 
over centuries to deal with unintended harms.8 The goals of this body of law are many: to reduce 
accidents, promote fairness, provide a peaceful means of dispute resolution, reallocate and spread 
losses, promote positive social values, and so forth.9 Whether tort law is the best means for 
achieving all of these goals is debatable, but jurists are united in considering accident reduction as 
one of the central, if not the primary, aims of tort law.10 By creating a framework for loss shifting 
from injured victims to tortfeasors, tort law deters unsafe conduct.11 A purely financially motivated 
rational actor will reduce potentially harmful activity to the extent that the cost of accidents 
exceeds the benefits of the activity.12 This liability framework has far-reaching and sometimes 
complex impacts on behavior. It can either accelerate or impede the introduction of new 
technologies.13 
Most injuries people cause are evaluated under a negligence standard, which requires 
unreasonable conduct to establish liability. However, when computers cause the same injuries, a 
strict liability standard applies. This distinction has significant financial consequences and 
corresponding impact on the rate of technology adoption.14 It discourages automation, because 
                                                 
8 See generally, Morton J. Horwitz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780–1860 (1977); see also Morton J. 
Horwitz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870–1960 (1992). 
9 See, e.g., George Priest, Satisfying the Multiple Goals of Tort Law, 22 Val. U. L. Rev. 643, 648 (1988). 
10 See, e.g., George Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of 
Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985). See also, Blomquist, Goals. Means, and Problems for Modern 
Tort Law: A Reply to Professor Priest, 22 VAL. V.L. REV. 621 (1988) (arguing that economic theory and moral 
philosophy both require accident reduction to be the primary aim of tort law).  
11 See, e.g., George Priest, Modern Tort Law and its Reform, 22 VAL. V.L. REV. I (1987) 
12 See, United States v. Carroll Towing Co. 159 F.2d 169 (2d. Cir. 1947).  
13 Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974) (holding that the standard of the profession of ophthalmology should 
not insulate providers from failure to test for glaucoma). Cf with, Gideon Parchomovsky and Alex Stein, Torts and 
Innovation, 107(2) Mich. L. Rev. 285 2008 (discussing how the role of custom in tort law impedes innovation). Nor is 
the idea that tort liability is a barrier to developments in machine intelligence new. Steven J. Frank, Tort Adjudication 
and the Emergence of Artificial Intelligence Software, 21 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 623, 639 (1987). 
14 See, e.g., Amy Finkelstein, Static and dynamic effects of health policy: Evidence from the vaccine industry, 119 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 527 (2004).  
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machines entail greater liability than people. It also means that in cases where automation will 
improve safety, the current framework to prevent accidents now has the opposite effect.  
This Article argues that the acts of autonomous computer tortfeasors should be evaluated 
under a negligence rather than a strict liability standard in cases where an autonomous computer is 
occupying the position of a reasonable person in the traditional negligence paradigm, and where 
automation is likely to improve safety. For the purposes of ultimate financial liability, the 
computer’s manufacturer/retailer should still be responsible for satisfying judgments under 
standard principles of product liability law.   
This Article employs a functional approach to distinguish an autonomous computer, robot, 
or machine from an ordinary product.15 Our relationship with technology has changed. Computers 
are no longer just inert tools directed by individuals. Rather, in at least some instances, computers 
are given tasks to complete and determine for themselves how to complete those tasks.  For 
instance, a person could instruct a self-driving car to take them from point A to point B, but would 
not control how the machine does so. By contrast, a person driving a conventional vehicle from 
point A to point B controls how the machine travels. This distinction is analogous to the distinction 
between employees and independent contractors, which centers on the degree of control and 
                                                 
15 Terms such as “robot,” “machine,” “artificial intelligence, “machine intelligence,” and even “computer” are not used 
consistently even in the scientific literature.  See Neil Johnson, et al., Abrupt Rise of New Machine Ecology Beyond 
Human Response Time, Sci. Reports, Sept. 11, 2013, at 1, 2 (discussing autonomy in the context of artificial 
intelligence). See, e.g., Matthew U. Scherer, Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks, Challenges, 
Competencies and Strategies, 29 (2) Harv. J. L. & Tech. 354, 358-362 (2016) (discussing difficulties with defining 
artificial intelligence); see also John McCarthy, What is Artificial Intelligence?, John McCarthy’s Home Page 2–3 
(Nov. 12, 2007) (discussing the lack of a standardized definition of artificial intelligence by the scientist who coined 
the term) 
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independence.16 As this Article uses such terms, autonomous machines or computer tortfeasors 
control the means of completing tasks, regardless of their programming.17 
Not only should computer tortfeasors be held to a negligence standard, but once computers 
become safer than people and practical to substitute, computers should become the new standard of 
care. This means that defendants would no longer have their liability based on what a hypothetical, 
reasonable person would have done in their situation, but what a computer would have done. While 
this will mean that the average person’s best efforts will no longer be sufficient to avoid liability, 
the rule would benefit the general welfare. It would not mandate automation in the interests of 
freedom and autonomy, but it would internalize the costs of accidents on human tortfeasors. People 
would engage in certain activities at their own peril. Such a rule is entirely consistent with the 
rationale for the objective standard of the reasonable person.  
This Article uses self-driving cars as a case study to demonstrate the need for a new torts 
paradigm.18 There is public concern over the safety of self-driving cars, but a staggering 94 percent 
of crashes involve human error. These contribute to around 35,000 fatalities a year in the U.S. at a 
cost of about $242 billion.19 Automated vehicles may already be safer than human drivers, but if 
                                                 
16 See, Yewens v Noakes (1880) 6 QBD 530 ("...a servant is a person who is subject to the command of his master as to 
the manner in which he shall do his work.")  
17 See, e.g., Ryan Abbott, I Think Therefore I Invent: Creative Computers and the Future of Patent Law, 57(4) B.C.L.R 
1079, 1083–1091 (2016) (discussing types of machine architectures including conventional knowledge based systems 
with expert rules as well as types of machine intelligence algorithms that result in unexpected machine behavior).  
18 Others have written about tort liability and self-driving vehicles, although primarily dealing with how existing law 
deals with accidents involving autonomous vehicles. See, e.g., F. Patrick Hubbard, “Sophisticated Robots”: Balancing 
Liability, Regulation, and Innovation, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1803 (2014) (arguing, using the example of self-driving 
vehicles, that the current framework provides an “appropriate balance of innovation and liability for personal injury.”); 
see also, Jeffrey K. Gurney, Sue My Car Not Me: Products Liabilty and Accidents Involving Autonomous Vehicles, U. 
ILL. J.L. TECH & POL’Y 247 (2013); see also, Gary E. Marchant & Rachel A. Lindor, The Coming Collision Between 
Autonomous Vehicles and the Liability System, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1321, 1323–25 (2012).  
19 U.S. Department of Transportation, FEDERAL AUTOMATED VEHICLES POLICY: ACCELERATING THE NEXT 
REVOLUTION IN ROADWAY SAFETY 5, Sept. 2016, available at https://www.transportation.gov/AV/federal-automated-
vehicles-policy-september-2016. General statistics related to motor vehicle accidents are published by the Insurance 
Institute for Highway Safety Highway Loss Data Institute, available at http://www.iihs.org/iihs/topics/t/general-
statistics/fatalityfacts/overview-of-fatality-facts. See, Sven A. Beiker, Legal Aspects of Autonomous Driving, 52 SANTA 
CLARA  L. REV. 1145, 1149 (2012) (noting that, “[d]river error is by far (95%) the most common factor implicated in 
vehicle accidents”). 
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not, they will be soon. Shifting to negligence would accelerate the adoption of driverless 
technologies, which, according to a report by the consulting firm McKinsey & Co., may otherwise 
not be widespread until the middle of the century.20 
Automated vehicles may be the most prominent and disruptive upcoming example of robots 
changing society, but this analysis applies to any context with computer tortfeasors. For instance, 
IBM’s flagship artificial intelligence system Watson is working with clinicians at Memorial Sloan 
Kettering to analyze patient medical records and provide evidence-based cancer treatment 
options.21 It even provides supporting literature to human physicians to support its 
recommendations.22 Like self-driving cars, Watson does not need to be perfect to improve safety—
it just needs to be better than people. In that respect, the bar is unfortunately low. Medical error is 
one of the leading causes of death.23 A 2016 study in the British Medical Journal (BMJ) reported 
that it is the third leading cause of death in the United States, ranking just behind cardiovascular 
disease and cancer.24 Some companies already claim their artificial intelligence systems outperform 
doctors, and that claim is not hard to swallow.25 Why should a computer not be able to outperform 
doctors when the computer can access the entire wealth of medical literature with perfect recall, 
                                                 
20 Michele Bertoncello and Dominik Wee, Ten Ways Autonomous Driving Could Redefine the Automotive World, 
McKinsey & Co., June, 2015, available at http://www.mckinsey.com/industries/automotive-and-assembly/our-
insights/ten-ways-autonomous-driving-could-redefine-the-automotive-world.  
21 IBM Watson for Oncology, available at http://www.ibm.com/watson/health/oncology/. 
22 Id. 
23 See, e.g., Kohn LT, Corrigan JM, Donaldson MS. To err is human: building a safer health system. National 
Academies Press, 1999. This landmark report published by the Institute of Medicine in 1999 was a wake-up call to the 
medical profession about the harmful effects of medical error. Yet the report was based on studies conducted in 1984 
and 1992. Martin A Makary and Michael Daniel, Medical Error—the Third Leading Cause of Death in the US, 353 
BMJ j2139 (2016). 
24 Martin A Makary and Michael Daniel, Medical Error—the Third Leading Cause of Death in the US, 353 BMJ j2139 
(2016). 
25 Roger Parloff, Why Deep Learning is Already Changing Your Life, Fortune, Sept. 28, 2016, http://fortune.com/ai-
artificial-intelligence-deep-machine-learning/. For example, Enlitic has a program for detecting and classifying lung 
cancers which the company claims has already outperformed human radiologists. Id.  
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benefit from the experience of directly having treated millions of patients, and be immune to 
fatigue?26 
The remaining Article is divided into three Parts. Part II provides background on the 
historical development of injuries caused by machines and how the law has evolved to address 
these harms. It discusses the role of tort law in injury prevention and the development of 
negligence and strict product liability. Part III argues that while some forms of automation should 
prevent accidents, tort law may act as a deterrent to adopting safer technologies. To encourage 
automation and improve safety, this Part proposes a new categorization of “computer-generated 
torts” for a subset of machine injuries. This would apply to cases in which an autonomous 
computer, robot, or machine is occupying the position of a reasonable person in the traditional 
negligence paradigm, and where automation is likely to improve safety. This Part contends that the 
acts of computer tortfeasors should be evaluated under a negligence standard rather than under 
principles of product liability, and it goes on to propose rules for implementing the system. Finally, 
Part IV argues that once computer operators become safer than people, and automation is practical, 
the “reasonable computer” should become the new standard of care. 
This Article is focused on the effects of automation on accidents, but automation implicates 
a host of social concerns. It is important that policy makers act to ensure that automation benefits 
everyone. Automation may increase productivity and wealth, but it may also contribute to 
unemployment, financial disparities, and decreased social mobility. These and other concerns are 
certainly important to consider in the automation discussion, but tort liability may not be the best 
mechanism to address every issue related to automation. 
                                                 
26 See, e.g., Saul N Weingart, et al., Epidemiology of Medical Error, 320 BMJ 774, 775 (2010) (discussing some of the 
causes of human medical error). 
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II. LIABILITY FOR MACHINE INJURIES  
A Brief History 
Injuries caused by machines are nothing new. For as long as people have used machines 
injuries have resulted—and machines have been with us for quite some time. The earliest evidence 
of simple machines, which are tools that redirect force to make work easier like pulleys and levers, 
dates back millions of years to the beginning of the Stone Age.27 In fact, the Stone Age is so named 
because it was characterized by the use of stone to make simple machines such as hand axes.28 The 
primary function of these tools was to hunt and cut meat,29 but they were also used to facilitate 
violence against people.30 Machines used in the furtherance of intentional torts were likely used 
negligently as well. Given that home knife accidents lead to about a third of a million emergency 
room visits a year in the U.S., it is not difficult to imagine that during the Stone Age these simple 
machines caused accidents.31  
As history progressed, and the use and complexity of simple machines grew, so too did the 
resultant injuries:32 Mesopotamian surgeons botched procedures,33 Greek construction zones were 
                                                 
27 Natural History Museum, Oldest Tool use and Meat-Eating Revealed, Aug. 12, 2010, available at 
https://web.archive.org/web/20100818123718/http://www.nhm.ac.uk/about-us/news/2010/august/oldest-tool-use-and-
meat-eating-revealed75831.html. 
28 Sonia Harmand, et al., 3.3-Million-Year-Old Stone Tools from Lomekwi 3, West Turkana, Kenya, May 21, 2015, 521 
Nature 310. 
29 Natural History Museum, Oldest Tool use and Meat-Eating Revealed, Aug. 12, 2010, available at 
https://web.archive.org/web/20100818123718/http://www.nhm.ac.uk/about-us/news/2010/august/oldest-tool-use-and-
meat-eating-revealed75831.html. 
30 M. Mirazon Lahr, et al., Inter-group Violence Among Early Holocen Hunter-gatherers of West Turkana, Kenya, 529 
Nature 394, Jan. 21, 2016. 
31 Joe Yonan, Knife Injuries and Other Kitchen Mishaps Afflict Both Top Chefs and Everyday Cooks, Jan. 7, 2013, 
The Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/knife-injuries-and-other-kitchen-
mishaps-afflict-both-top-chefs-and-everyday-cooks/2013/01/07/92e191f8-4af0-11e2-b709-667035ff9029_story.html. 
32 For example, around a half a million people died building the Great Wall of China, although the number of these 
deaths due to machine injuries is unknown. Gregory P Guyton, A Brief History of Workers’ Compensation, Iowa 19 
Orthop. J. 106–7, 1999. So common were machine and industrial injuries in the ancient world that ancient Greek, 
Roman, Arab, and Chinese laws provided for compensation schedules for accidents. See id. Under ancient Arab law, 
“loss of a joint of the thumb was worth one-half the value of a finger. The loss of a penis was compensated by the 
amount of length lost, and the value an ear was based on its surface area.” Id.   
33 Emily K. Teall, Medicine and Doctoring in Ancient Mesopotamia, 3 Grand Valley Journal of History 1(2), (2014). 
Unfortunately for these doctors, medical malpractice in Babylon was corporally punishable. Allen D. Spiegel and 
Christopher R. Springer, Babylonian Medicine, Managed Care and Codex Hammurabi, circa 1700 B.C., 22 Journal of 
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so dangerous they required physicians on site,34 and Egyptian embalmers accidently left 
instruments in their subjects.35 Such injuries continued unabated from the time complex machines 
were invented by the ancient Chinese and Greeks to the time of the first modern industrial 
machines.36 
The Industrial Revolution marked a turning point in the role of machines in society.37 Major 
technological advances occurred during this period in textiles, transportation, and iron making, and 
resulted in the development of machines for shaping materials and the rise of the factory system. It 
also resulted in a dramatic increase in the number and severity of machine injuries.38 Working in 
industrial settings was a dangerous business, in part because employers often had minimal liability 
for employee harms.39 These dangerous working conditions persisted well into the 20th Century 
before the U.S. government began collecting data on work-related injuries in a systematic way.40 In 
1913, the Bureau of Labor estimated that 23,000 workers died from work-related injuries (albeit an 
                                                 
Community Health 73 (1997); See also, Guido Majno, THE HEALING HAND: MAN AND WOUND IN THE ANCIENT 
WORLD, 53 (1975).   
34 David Matz, VOICES OF ANCIENT GREECE AND ROME: CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTS OF DAILY LIFE 57–58 (2012); See 
also, Y. C. Chiu, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF PROJECT MANAGEMENT 19–115 (2010) (discussing the use of 
technology in industrial activities). 
35 Granted, this example involves cadavers rather than living patients, or so one hopes. Owen Jarus, Oops! Brain-
Removal Tool Left in Mummy’s Skull, Dec. 14, 2012, Live Science, http://www.livescience.com/25536-mummy-brain-
removal-tool.html/. It certainly portends modern medical malpractice cases involving retained surgical instruments. 
See, e.g., Atul A. Gawande, et al., Risk Factors for Retained Instruments and Sponges after Surgery, 348 NEJM 229 
(Jan. 16, 2003).  
36 Peter Lu, Early Precision Compound Machine from Ancient China, 304 Science 1638 (2004). 
37 Economists have argued the Industrial Revolution was, “certainly the most important event in the history of 
humanity since the domestication of animals and plants, perhaps the most important since the invention of language. It 
bids fair to free us all, eventually.” Deirde McCloskey, Review of The Cambridge Economic History of Modern 
Britain (edited by Roderick Floud and Paul Johnson), Times Higher Education Supplement, 15 January 2004. 
38 See generally, Henry R. Seager, SOCIAL INSURANCE: A PROGRAM OF SOCIAL REFORM 24–52 (1910) (chapter on 
industrial accidents in a classic exposition of the philosophical movement for social insurance).  
39 JS Haller, Industrial accidents-worker compensation laws and the medical response, 148 Western J of Med. 341–
348 (1988); see also, Morton Horowitz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 90 (1977). 
40 U.S. Department of Labor, Progressive Era Investigations, https://www.dol.gov/dol/aboutdol/history/mono-
regsafepart05.htm. The first systematic U.S. survey of workplace fatalities found that 526 workers died in “work 
accidents” in Allegheny County from July 1906–June 1907. Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Improvements 
in Workplace Safety—United States, 1900–1999, 48 (22) MMWR 461, June 11, 1999. Of those fatalities, 195 were 
steelworkers. Contrast that with 17 national steelworker fatalities in 1997. Id. 
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imperfect proxy for machine injuries) out of a workforce of 38 million, which works out to a rate of 
61 deaths per 100,000 workers.41 
In our era, the rate of work-related injuries has declined significantly. In 2014, for example, 
the Bureau of Labor reported 4,679 fatal work injuries, a rate of 3.3 per 100,000 workers.42 The 
reason for this decline is multifactorial: changes to tort liability, evolved societal and ethics norms 
that place a greater priority on human welfare, a modern system of regulations and criminal 
liability that protects worker wellbeing, as well as improvements in safety technology. Yet despite 
significant progress in workplace safety, accidents are still a serious societal concern. Workplace 
accidents were responsible for nearly 5,000 deaths in 2014 in the U.S., at a total cost of about $190 
billion.43 More broadly, there were a total of about 193,000 injury-related deaths in 2014 in the 
U.S. at a cost of some $850 billion.44 Unintentional injuries are the fourth leading cause of death.45  
Tort Law as a Mechanism for Accident Prevention  
Part of the reason for the decline in workplace injuries is that tort law now provides a 
stronger financial incentive for safer conduct. The law has evolved from a system designed to 
insulate employers and manufacturers from liability to one with greater regard for worker and 
consumer health.46 
                                                 
41 Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Improvements in Workplace Safety—United States, 1900–1999, 48 (22) 
MMWR 461, June 11, 1999. The National Safety Council estimated that 18,000–21,000 workers died from work-
related injuries in 1912. Id. 
42 Bureau of Labor Statistics, National Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries in 2014, available at 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/cfoi.pdf. 
43 National Safety Council, INJURY FACTS 2016 EDITION 3 (2016). 
44 Id.  Lost quality of life from those injuries is valued at an addition $3,611.5 billion. Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Tort law “primarily grew out of a focus on bodily injury and physical property damage, but protection has been 
extended beyond the physical to include harm to reputation, privacy, emotional well-being, and economic loss.” 
Dominick R. Vetri, et al., THE FUNCTIONS AND GOALS OF TORT LAW 5th ED, 3 (2016) (hereinafter “Vetri”). “The range 
of torts is as broad as human experience and includes such wrongful conduct as negligence (personal injury law for 
unintentional harm), intentional torts (e.g., assault and battery), products liability (defective products), abnormally 
dangerous activities liability (e.g., blasting, aerial pesticide spraying), nuisance (e.g., air, water, and noise pollution), 
defamation (libel and slander), privacy invasion (private areas intrusion and personal autonomy interference), and fraud 
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A tort is a harmful civil act, as opposed to a criminal act, other than under contract, where 
one person is damaged by another, and it gives way to a right to sue.47 A variety of goals have been 
proposed for tort law: to reduce accidents, promote fairness, provide a peaceful means of dispute 
resolution, reallocate and spread losses, promote positive social values, and so forth.48 Whether tort 
law is the best means for achieving all of these goals is a matter of endless dispute.49 However, 
jurists are united in considering accident reduction as one of the central goals of tort law, if not the 
primary goal.50 By creating a framework for loss shifting from injured victims to tortfeasors, tort 
law deters unsafe conduct.51 A purely financially motivated rational actor will reduce potentially 
harmful activity to the extent that the cost of accidents exceeds the benefits of the activity.52  
On a broader level, the law of torts is one of the primary ways in which society choses to 
allocate liability. And allocating liability has far-reaching and sometimes complex impacts on 
behavior. In its quest to reduce accidents, tort law can either accelerate the introduction of new 
technologies, as was the case with the use of glaucoma testing and pulse oximeters, or it can 
discourage the use of new technologies, as is usually the case where the standard of care is based 
on custom.53  
                                                 
(misrepresentation). Tort law study also includes consideration of legislative measures related to tort liability, for 
example, automobile no-fault systems and the 9-11 compensation system.” Id. 
47 See, Id. at 2. It governs loss shifting from injured victims to tortfeasors, and it dictates who can sue and what they 
can sue for. Id. It is, “the set of rules regarding liability and compensation for personal injury, death, and property 
damage that one party causes to another.”  Id. 
48 See, e.g., George Priest, Satisfying the Multiple Goals of Tort Law, 22 Val. U. L. Rev. 643, 648 (1988).  
49 See, e.g., George Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of 
Modern Tort Law, 14 J. Legal Stud. 461 (1985).  
50 See, Blomquist, Goals. Means, and Problems for Modern Tort Law: A Reply to Professor Priest, 22 Val. V. L. Rev. 
621 (1988) (arguing that economic theory and moral philosophy both require accident reduction to be the primary aim 
of tort law).  
51 See, e.g., George Priest, Satisfying the Multiple Goals of Tort Law, 22 Val. U. L. Rev. 643, 648 (1988). 
52 See, United States v. Carroll Towing Co. 159 F.2d 169 (2d. Cir. 1947).  
53 Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974) (holding that the standard of the profession of ophthalmology should 
not insulate providers from failure to test for glaucoma). Cf with, Gideon Parchomovsky and Alex Stein, Torts and 
Innovation, 107(2) Mich. L. Rev. 285 2008 (discussing how the role of custom in tort law impedes innovation). 
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Torts are typically categorized based on the level of fault they require (or based on the 
interests they protect). On one end of the spectrum are intentional torts involving intent to harm or 
malice, on the other are strict liability torts which do not require fault. Covering the “great mass of 
cases” in the middle are harms involving negligence.54 
Negligence 
The concept of negligence is the primary theory through which courts deal with accidents 
and unintended harms.55 In practice, for a plaintiff to prevail in most personal injury cases, he or 
she must prove by a preponderance of evidence that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of 
reasonable care, that the defendant breached that duty, that the breach caused the plaintiff’s 
damages, and that the plaintiff suffered compensable damages. This generally requires proof that 
the defendant acted negligently, which is to say, unreasonably considering foreseeable risks. This 
standard is premised on what an objective and hypothetical “reasonable” person would have done 
under the same circumstances.56 Thus, if a reasonable person would not have headed out to sea 
without a radio to warn of storm conditions,57 manufactured a ginger beer with a snail inside,58 or 
dropped heavy objects off the side of a building,59 then these activities could expose a defendant to 
liability. 
                                                 
54 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Torts, 7 AM. L. REV  652, 653 (1873) in 1 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF 
JUSTICE HOLMES 327 (Sheldon M. Novick ed., 1995). 
55 Thomas C. Grey, Accidental Torts, 54 Vanderbilt Law Review 25 (2001). 
56 The idea that negligence involves conduct that falls below an objective standard was first articulated by Baron 
Alderson in the case of Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co.,11 Ex. 781, 156 Eng. Rep. 1047 (Exch. 1856): 
“Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which 
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man 
would not do. The defendants might have been liable for negligence, if, unintentionally, they omitted to do that which a 
reasonable person would have done, or did that which a person taking reasonable precautions would not have done.” 
Id. at 1049.  
57 The T.J. Hooper, 53 F.2d 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1931). 
58 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562. 
59 Byrne v Boadle (2 Hurl. & Colt. 722, 159 Eng. Rep. 299, 1863). 
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Negligence strikes a balance between the interests of plaintiffs and defendants. Society has 
interests in reducing injuries and compensating victims as well as encouraging economic growth 
and progress.60 One of the ways that tort law attempts to achieve this balance is by permitting 
recovery in negligence only where there has been socially blameworthy conduct.61  Thus, where a 
defendant has acted reasonably, even if the defendant has caused serious injury to a plaintiff, there 
will be no liability. Juries play a key role in determining the reasonable person standard as applied 
to the facts of a case.62  
Strict & Product Liability 
While negligence governs virtually all accidents, there are exceptions. For instance, 
defendants may be strictly liable for harms they cause as a result of certain types of activities such 
as hazardous waste disposal and blasting.63 Strict liability is a theory of liability without fault; it is 
essentially based on causation without regard to whether a defendant’s conduct is socially 
blameworthy.64 Thus, a defendant corporation which takes every reasonable care to prevent injury 
before dusting crops may nevertheless find itself liable for injuries it causes to a bystander. 
One of the most important modern applications of strict liability is to product liability. 
Product liability refers to responsibility for the commercial transfer of a product that causes harm 
because it is defective or its properties are falsely represented.65 Product injuries cause upwards of 
                                                 
60 Vetri at 12.  
61 See James Barr Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97, 99 (1908). 
62 Vetri at 10. 
63 Id. at 11.  
64 See, e.g., Rylands v. Fletcher, 2 L.Q. REV. 52 (1886). While early English common law imposed strict liability for 
certain wrongs such as trespass, Rylands was the progenitor of the doctrine of strict liability for abnormally dangerous 
activities, and its ruling had a major impact on the development of tort law. In the case, Fletcher’s reservoir burst and 
flooded a neighboring mine run by Rylands through no fault of Fletcher. This court held that "the person who for his 
own purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it 
in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence 
of its escape." Id. Critics of the case objected to its potential impact on economic activity. See, e.g., Brown v. Collins, 
53 N.H. 443, 445-46 (1873) (repudiating Rylands, and stating, “liberal principles of formal equality and economic 
freedom, or a devotion to economic development, required rejection of tort liability without fault”).  
65 David G. Owen. OWEN’S PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, 3RD ED (Hornbook Series) 1 (2015). 
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200 million injuries a year.66 In most instances, manufacturers (and retailers) are strictly liable for 
defective products. The bulk of product liability cases involve claims for damages against a 
manufacturer or retailer by a person injured while using a product.67 Typically, a plaintiff will try 
to prove that an injury was the result of some inherent defect of a product or its marketing, and that 
the product was flawed or falsely advertised.68 Defendants, in turn, attempt to prove that their 
products were reasonably designed, properly made, and accurately marketed.69 Defendants may 
argue that plaintiff injuries were the result of improper and unforeseeable use of the product, or that 
something other than the product caused the harm.70 
Product liability was not always governed by strict liability. Originally, American courts 
followed the English doctrine of caveat emptor (let the buyer beware) for product liability claims, 
reflecting a national philosophy embracing individualism and free enterprise.71 However, toward 
the end of the 19th century, states began increasingly employing the doctrine of caveat venditor and 
an implied warranty of merchantable quality.72 Under this doctrine, “[s]elling for a sound price 
raises an implied warranty that the thing sold is free from defects, known and unknown [to the 
seller].”73 Ultimately, the doctrine of implied warranty of merchantable quality was reduced to 
statutory form in the Uniform Sales Act of 1906.74 Yet even so, manufacturers were in large part 
able to avoid liability for defective products by arguing they lacked privity of contract with 
                                                 
66 Id. at 1. 
67 Id. At 3. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 1. 
72 Id. 
73 175 Gardiner v. Gray, (1815) 171 Eng. Rep. 46, 47 (K.B.). 
74 1 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED, SALES, CUM. SUPP. 6 (1948). See generally, F. Kessler, The Protection of the 
Consumer Under Modern Sales Law 74 Yale L. J. 262 (1964)  
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consumers.75 This was because in most cases consumers purchased products from third-party 
retailers rather than directly from manufacturers.76 
That changed in 1916 with the New York Court of Appeals decision in MacPherson v. 
Buick Motor Co.77 The case involved a motorist injured when one of the wooden wheels of his 
Buick collapsed. He subsequently attempted to sue the manufacturer (Buick) rather than the 
dealership from which he purchased the vehicle. In rejecting a defense based on privity of contact, 
the court held that if “the manufacturer of such a foreseeably dangerous product knows that it will 
be used by persons other than the purchaser, and used without new tests, then, irrespective of 
contract, the manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a duty to make it carefully.”78 
MacPherson spurred negligence claims against manufacturers across the country as state courts 
one-by-one adopted MacPherson’s holding.79 This shift was accompanied by growing public 
support for consumer protection together with the understanding that liability would not unduly 
burden economic activity. Businesses are often in the best position to prevent product injuries, and 
can distribute liability through insurance.80 
In 1963, the Supreme Court of California decided Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 
which held that manufacturers of defective products are strictly liable for injuries caused by such 
                                                 
75 David G. Owen. OWEN’S PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, 3RD ED (Hornbook Series) 18 (2015).  
76 Id.  
77 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). 
78 Id. at 1054.  
79 David G. Owen. OWEN’S PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, 3RD ED (Hornbook Series) 22 (2015). Maine was the last state to 
abolish the privity requirement in negligence actions in 1982. Id. 
80 Id.  
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products.81 This case represents the birth of modern products liability law in America.82 After this 
decision, the doctrine of strict product liability spread rapidly across the nation in the 1960s, with 
the American Law Institute memorializing the rule in Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts.83 
Of course, today’s products liability law is not as simple as this brief narrative suggests.84 It 
combines tort law (e.g., negligence, strict liability, and deceit), contract law (e.g., warranty), both 
common and statutory law (e.g., statutory sales law under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code), and a hodgepodge of state “reform” acts.85 Since the 1960s, a variety of state statutes have 
attempted to reform products liability law, often to limit the rights of consumers in order to protect 
manufacturers.86 For our purposes, however, it suffices to say that as a general matter, 
manufacturers and retailers are strictly liable for injuries caused by defective products.87 
                                                 
81 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. 59 Cal.2d 456 (1963). Of note, Justice Roger Traynor who wrote a majority 
opinion in the case, had suggested this strict liability rule 19 years earlier in a concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca-
Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944). He argued responsibility should “be fixed wherever it will 
most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in defective products that reach the market." Greenman 
v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. 59 Cal.2d 57 (1963). A few years before this case, New Jersey found manufacturese 
strictly liable in warrantee to remote consumers in Henningsen v. Bloomfield motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 
(1960).  
82 David G. Owen. OWEN’S PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, 3RD ED (Hornbook Series) 23 (2015). 
83 Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A (1965).  
84 For a more comprehensive view on products liability, the American Law Institute published a Restatement 
specifically on products liability in 1998. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability. 
85 David G. Owen. OWEN’S PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, 3RD ED (Hornbook Series) 4 (2015). 
86 Id. at 23. 
87 Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co. , 61 Cal.2d 256, 262–263. “Retailers like manufacturers are engaged in the business 
of distributing goods to the public. They are an integral part of the overall producing and marketing enterprise that 
should bear the cost of injuries resulting from defective products. In some cases the retailer may be the only member of 
that enterprise reasonably available to the injured plaintiff. In other cases the retailer himself may play a substantial 
part in insuring that the product is safe or may be in a position to exert pressure on the manufacturer to that end; the 
retailer's strict liability thus serves as an added incentive to safety. Strict liability on the manufacturer and retailer alike 
affords maximum protection to the injured plaintiff and works no injustice to the defendants, for they can adjust the 
costs of such protection between them in the course of their continuing business relationship.” Id (internal citations 
omitted). 
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III. COMPUTER-GENERATED TORTS 
Automation Will Prevent Accidents  
On May 7, 2016, a Tesla driver was killed in the first known fatal crash of a self-driving 
car.88 Tesla reported that the autopilot system did not apply the brakes after the car’s sensor system 
failed to detect an 18-wheel truck and trailer.89 The car attempted to drive full speed under the 
trailer and the bottom of the trailer impacted the car’s windshield.90 The driver, who Tesla claims 
should have remained alert and who also failed to apply the brakes, may have been watching a 
Harry Potter movie at the time.91  
Surveys of attitudes toward self-driving cars have produced mixed results, but have often 
uncovered negative opinions.92 A survey by the American Automobile Association (AAA) in 
March, 2016, reported that three out of four U.S. drivers surveyed said they would feel “afraid” to 
ride in a self-driving car.93 Only one in five said they would trust a driverless car to drive itself 
while they were inside.94 Another recent survey found that most UK citizens would feel 
                                                 
88 Anjali Singhvi and Karl Russell, Inside the Self-Driving Tesla Fatal Accident, New York Times, Jul. 12, 2016 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/07/01/business/inside-tesla-accident.html?_r=0. This has been the first 
reported fatality, but not the only reported crash for which a self-driving vehicle has been at fault. See, e.g., Tan 
Weizhen, Self-driving Car in Accident with Lorry at One-North, Today Online, Oct. 18, 2016, 
http://www.todayonline.com/singapore/self-driving-car-involved-accident-one-north.  Other, non-fatal accidents, have 
been attributed to self-driving vehicles; see also Dave Lee, Google Self-Driving Car Hits a Bus, BBC News, Feb. 29, 
2016, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-35692845. 
89 Sam Levin and Nicky Woolf, Tesla Driver Killed While Using Autopilot Was Watching Harry Potter, Witness Says, 
The Guardian, Jul 1 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jul/01/tesla-driver-killed-autopilot-self-
driving-car-harry-potter. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Similarly, a poll of 1869 registered voters in January, 2016 by New Morning Consult found that 43 percent of 
registered voters said self-driving cars were unsafe, while only 32 percent said they were safe. Fifty-one percent of 
respondents said they would not ride in a driverless car, while 25 percent said they would. Amir Nasr and Fawn 
Johnson, Voters Aren’t Ready for Driverless Cars, Poll Shows, Morning Consult, Feb. 8, 2016, 
https://morningconsult.com/2016/02/08/voters-arent-ready-for-driverless-cars-poll-shows/; see also, Paul Lienert, 
Tesla Crash Does Little to Sway Public Opinion on Self-Driving Cars, Automotive News, Jul. 29, 2016, 
http://www.autonews.com/article/20160729/OEM06/160729812/tesla-crash-does-little-to-sway-public-opinion-on-
self-driving-cars (discussing the results of other surveys). 
93 Erin Stepp, Three-Quarters of Americans “Afraid” to Ride in Self-Driving Vehicle, AAA News Room, Mar. 1, 2016, 
http://newsroom.aaa.com/2016/03/three-quarters-of-americans-afraid-to-ride-in-a-self-driving-vehicle/. 
94 Id.   
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uncomfortable with self-driving vehicles on the road, and more than three quarters would want to 
retain a steering wheel.95 Regulators are more optimistic than the public, but they are still 
cautious.96 California until very recently required human drivers to be present in all self-driving 
cars being tested on public roads.97 Two new laws passed in 2016 now permit unmanned vehicles 
to operate on public roads under certain circumstances.98 
Yet much of the public discourse on self-driving cars is misguided. The critical issue is not 
whether computers are perfect (they are not), but whether they are safer than people (they are). 
Nearly all crashes involve human error.99 A human driver causes a fatality about every 100 million 
miles, resulting in tremendous human and financial costs.100 The U.S. Department of 
Transportation reports that more than 35,000 people died from motor vehicle accidents in the U.S. 
in 2015. It estimates the economic costs of those accidents at over $240 billion.101  
By contrast, the Tesla fatality was the first known autopilot death in about 130 million 
miles driven by the system.102 It is also important to note that driverless technologies are in their 
infancy. Imagine how improved such technologies will be in 10 years. One academic expert 
predicted in September of 2016 that self-driving cars will be 10 times safer than human drivers in 
                                                 
95 David Neal, Over Half of Brits Won’t Feel Safe Using the Streets With Driverless Cars, The Inquirer, Oct. 17, 2016,  
http://www.theinquirer.net/inquirer/news/2474351/over-half-of-brits-wont-feel-safe-using-the-streets-with-driverless-
cars.  
96 As reflected, for example, in guidelines released in September, 2016 by the Department of Transportation for safe 
design, development and testing of self-driving cars. U.S. Department of Transportation, FEDERAL AUTOMATED 
VEHICLES POLICY: ACCELERATING THE NEXT REVOLUTION IN ROADWAY SAFETY 5, Sept. 2016, available at 
https://www.transportation.gov/AV/federal-automated-vehicles-policy-september-2016. 
97 Susmita Baral, Driverless Car Laws in California Get Major Changes in September, International Business Times, 
Oct. 3, 2016, http://www.ibtimes.com/driverless-car-laws-california-get-major-changes-september-2425689.  
98 Id. 
99 U.S. Department of Transportation, FEDERAL AUTOMATED VEHICLES POLICY: ACCELERATING THE NEXT 
REVOLUTION IN ROADWAY SAFETY 5, Sept. 2016, available at https://www.transportation.gov/AV/federal-automated-
vehicles-policy-september-2016.  
100 Alexander Hars, Top Misconceptions of Autonomous Cars and Self-Driving Vehicles, Inventivio Innovation Briefs, 
Issue 2016-09 at 6, http://www.inventivio.com/innovationbriefs/2016-09/Top-misconceptions-of-self-driving-cars.pdf.  
101 Insurance Institute for Highway Safety Highway Loss Data Institute, available at 
http://www.iihs.org/iihs/topics/t/general-statistics/fatalityfacts/overview-of-fatality-facts. 
102 The Tesla Team, A Tragic Loss, Jun. 30, 2016, available at https://www.tesla.com/en_GB/blog/tragic-loss.  
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three years, and 100 times safer in ten years.103 At the point where automated cars are 10 times 
safer than human drivers, that could reduce the annual number of motor vehicle fatalities to about 
3,500. That was the conclusion of a report from the consulting firm McKinsey & Company, which 
predicted autonomous vehicles would reduce the number of auto deaths by about 30,000 a year.104 
However, the report estimated that self-driving technologies would not be widely enough adopted 
to permit this outcome until the middle of the century.105  
Tort Liability Discourages Automation  
To see why tort law discourages automation, we can look at the question of when it makes 
economic sense from a business point of view to replace a human operator with a computer 
operator. In practice, it might be complex to calculate the cost of each operator. Human employees 
have costs in excess of their salaries and wages, such as tax liability for employer portions of 
Social Security tax, Medicare tax, State and Federal unemployment tax, and Worker’s 
Compensation; employer portions of health insurance; paid holidays, vacations and sick days, 
contributions toward retirement, pension, savings and profit-sharing plans, etc.106  Computer costs 
may be simpler to estimate, but may also be uncertain. In addition to purchase or license costs and 
taxes, there may be costs associated with repair, maintenance, and operation. 
                                                 
103 Michael Belfiore, Self-Driving Cars Will Be 10x Safer Than Human Drivers in 3 Years, Sep. 20, 2016, 
http://michaelbelfiore.com/2016/09/20/self-driving-cars-will-be-10x-safer-than-human-drivers-in-3-years/. Similarly, 
Bob Lutz, former General Motors vice chairman, predicted that GM’s first autonomous cars would have accident rate 
about 10% of those of human drivers. Michelle Fox, CNBC, Self-driving Cars Safer Than Those Driven By Humans: 
Bob Lutz, Sep. 8, 2014, http://www.cnbc.com/2014/09/08/self-driving-cars-safer-than-those-driven-by-humans-bob-
lutz.html.  
104 Michele Bertoncello and Dominik Wee, Ten Ways Autonomous Driving Could Redefine the Automotive World, 
McKinsey & Co., June, 2015, available at http://www.mckinsey.com/industries/automotive-and-assembly/our-
insights/ten-ways-autonomous-driving-could-redefine-the-automotive-world.  
105 Id. 
106 See Bret N. Bogenschneider, The Effective Tax Rate of U.S. Persons by Income Level, 145 Tax Notes 117 (2014); 
see also generally, Wayne F Cascio, COSTING HUMAN RESOURCES (1991). 
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Added to the direct financial costs associated with employing an operator, there may be 
indirect financial and non-financial costs, known and unknown, that guide a decision.107 For 
example, a person may require vocational training or be unable to work due to sickness, or a 
computer may require software updates or be unable to work due to malfunctioning. Human 
operators may result in greater expenses for legal fees, admin and overhead, as well as compliance 
with regulatory and employment requirements.108 Computer operators may infringe patents, or 
result in negative publicity.109 Whether to staff with a person or a computer may also take into 
account broader social policies. For instance, automation may promote income inequality and 
unemployment. But businesses are required to act in the best interests of shareholders, and most 
businesses interpret this duty as a mandate to maximize profit rather than to promote social 
responsibility.110 
The decision of whether to employ a computer or human operator, even where the two are 
capable of functioning interchangeably, may therefore be a complex one. Nevertheless, these are 
precisely the sorts of decisions that businesses are skilled at making—estimating uncertain future 
costs relatively accurately, and making decisions as rational economic actors.111 Tort liability will 
only be one factor to consider when deciding whether to employ a computer or human operator. 
But, in the aggregate, tort liability will influence computer adoption. 
                                                 
107 See, Alfred Marshall, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS V.V. (1920). 
108 Centre for Economics and Business Research, Cost of Small Business Employment, Oct. 30, 2014, 
www.cebr.com/reports/cost-of-small-business-employment/. 
109 See, e.g., Kate Taylor, McDonald’s ex-CEO Just Revealed a Terrifying Reality for Fast-Food Workers, Business 
Insider UK, May 25, 2016, http://uk.businessinsider.com/mcdonalds-ex-ceo-takes-on-minimum-wage-2016-5 
(discussing criticism of McDonald’s for replacing workers with machines).  
110 See generally, Dodge v. Ford, 170 N.W. 668. (Mich. 1919). Of course, many companies argue they promote 
corporate social responsibility, and in some circumstances, there may be a business case for doing so. See, e.g., Archie 
B. Carroll and Kareem M. Shabana, The Business Case for Corporate Social Responsibility: A Review of Concepts, 
Research and Practice, Int’l J. of Mgmt. Rev. 85 (2010).  
111 See, e.g., Hugh Courtney, Jane Kirkland, and Patrick Viguerie, Strategy Under Uncertainty, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov-
Dec 1997).  
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As with some of these other factors, the costs of tort liability may not be straightforward. 
For instance, businesses may not be directly liable for harms caused by autonomous computers. 
The computer’s manufacturer and other members of the supply chain will generally be liable. By 
contrast, businesses will generally be liable for negligent harms caused by their employees, 
although businesses can attempt to limit this liability, for instance, by relying on independent 
contractors.112 Businesses are not usually liable for negligent harms caused by their independent 
contractors.113  
Yet even in cases where liability rests with a manufacturer/retailer or an independent 
contractor, it will have an indirect impact on a business. A manufacturer/retailer may pass along 
their costs in the form of higher prices, or, a business may need to pay an independent contractor 
more than an employee to have the contractor assume risk. The percentage of cost which is passed 
on to the business or consumer will depend on the market and price elasticity for that product.114 
Yet the fact that tort liability may be indirect and complex, or that firms may purchase insurance to 
manage risk, does not change the fact that tort liability has a financial cost which influences 
behavior.  
Leaving aside tort liability, if both operators cost a business the same amount to employ, the 
decision of whether to utilize a person or computer should be neutral. If we introduce the variable 
of tort liability into the decision, a human operator would be preferred. Harms caused by a person 
will be evaluated in negligence but the same harms caused by a computer will be evaluated in strict 
                                                 
112 See, e.g., Kleeman v. Rheingold, 81 N.Y.2d 270 (1993). There are, however, limits on the extent to which 
businesses can rely on independent contractors or attempt to classify employees as independent contractors. See, e.g., 
In re Morton, 284 N.Y. 167, 172 (1940). As another example of how business can avoid tort liability for the actions of 
human operators, employers are not generally liable for intentional torts committed by employees.  
113 Id. 
114 See, generally, Office of Fair Trading, Cost pass-through: theory, measurement, and potential policy implications. 
RBB Economics, February 2014.  
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liability. It is easier to establish strict liability than negligence.115 Strict liability does not require 
careless manufacturer behavior, only that a defect be present in a product. At least with regards to 
tort liability, the law thus favors people over machines. This will hold true as long as computers are 
treated as ‘ordinary products’ as to which strict liability is the default rule.  
Computer-Generated Torts Should Be Negligence-Based 
Holding computer-generated torts to a negligence standard will result in an improved 
outcome: it will accelerate the adoption of automation where doing so would reduce accidents. Of 
course, moving from a strict liability to a negligence standard would have some drawbacks. As 
mentioned earlier, strict liability creates a stronger incentive for manufacturers to make safer 
products, and manufacturers may be better positioned than consumers to insure against loss. 
Indeed, this is why courts initially adopted strict product liability. However, computer-generated 
torts differ from other product harms in that—once machines become safer than people—
automation will result in net safety gains. 
To illustrate this, imagine that with current technology a computer driver would be 10 times 
safer than a human driver. In this case, it would be better that one human driver is replaced by a 
machine than that the same machine becomes 100 times safer than a human driver. To see why that 
                                                 
115 See Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp. 8 Cal. 3d 122 (1972). (“[T]he very purpose of our pioneering efforts in [strict 
product liability] was to relieve the plaintiff from problems of proof inherent in pursuing negligence (Escola v. Coca 
Cola Bottling Co., supra, 24 Cal.2d 453, 461-462 (Traynor, J., concurring)) and warranty (Greenman v. Yuba Power 
Products, Inc., supra, 59 Cal.2d 57, 63) remedies, and thereby "to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from 
defective products are borne by the manufacturers ... ." (Id.; see Price v. Shell Oil Co., supra, 2 Cal.3d 245, 251.)”) Id 
at 133. See also, Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. 59 Cal.2d 456 (1963). (“It is to the public interest to 
discourage the marketing of products having defects that are a menace to the public. If such products nevertheless find 
their way into the market it is to the public interest to place the responsibility for whatever injury they may cause upon 
the manufacturer, who, even if he is not negligent in the manufacture of the product, is responsible for its reaching the 
market. However intermittently such injuries may occur and however haphazardly they may strike, the risk of their 
occurrence is a constant risk and a general one. Against such a risk there should be general and constant protection and 
the manufacturer is best situated to afford such protection.”) Id at 462.  
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is so, assume a closed system with only two vehicles, where the risk of injury for a human driver is 
one fatality per 100 million miles driven and the risk of injury for a computer driver (which we will 
name model C-A) is 1 fatality per 1 billion miles driven. C-A is 10 times safer than a person. Over 
the course of 10 billion miles driven by the person and C-A, there will be an average of 110 
fatalities.  
Now imagine that we are able to improve C-A an additional ten-fold such that its risk of 
causing injury is reduced to 1 fatality per 10 billion miles (C-A+). Then, over the course of 10 
billion miles driven by the person and C-A+, there will be a total of 101 fatalities. However, if 
instead of focusing our efforts on improving C-A we simply replace the human driver with another 
C-A, then over the course of 10 billion miles driven by C-A & C-A there will be a total of 20 
fatalities. Once computers become safer than people, and particularly once computers become 
substantially safer than people, very significant reductions in accident rates will be gained by 
automation. Therefore—at some point—it is preferable to weaken the incentive to gain incremental 
improvements in product safety in order to increase the adoption of safer technologies.  
Also, even under a negligence standard, manufacturers will be incentivized to improve the 
safety of their computer systems because they may still be liable for accidents. If Tesla’s autopilot 
were tried under a negligence standard for failing to detect an 18-wheel truck and trailer, it would 
likely be held liable. A human driver would have been careless at best. Manufacturers will likely 
have the best information available to determine whether it would be better to pay to further reduce 
accident risks, e.g., whether an additional $10,000 per vehicle is worth a 1% reduction in accident 
risk, or whether to pay claims for additional accidents. Higher safety levels are not always better; 
inefficiently high safety levels may result in prohibitively high prices for consumers.116 To the 
                                                 
116 David G. Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 Vand. L. Rev. 681, 715 (1980). 
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extent that society is not satisfied with a manufacturer’s risk-benefit analysis on optimum safety 
levels, non-tort mechanisms could be brought to bear, such as regulatory mandates for minimum 
safety standards. Finally, to the extent that risk spreading is a concern, while businesses may be 
better positioned to acquire insurance, consumers also have options to purchase insurance, 
particularly in the automobile context.117  
There is justification for separating out harms caused by ordinary products like 
MacPherson’s Buick and “computer tortfeasors” like Tesla’s autonomous driving software. Our 
relationship with technology has changed. Computers are no longer just inert tools directed by 
individuals. Rather, in at least some instances, computers are taking over activities once performed 
by people and causing the same sorts of harm these activities generate. Computers are stepping into 
the shoes of a reasonable person. 
What distinguishes an ordinary product from a computer tortfeasor in this system are the 
concepts of independence and control. Autonomous computers, robots, or machines are given tasks 
to complete, but determine for themselves the means of completing those tasks. In some instances, 
machine learning can generate unpredictable behavior such that the means are not predictable 
either by those giving tasks to computers or even by the computer’s original programmers.118 But 
the difference between ordinary products and autonomous computers should not be based on 
                                                 
117 Id, at 694. 
118 Curtis E.A. Karnow, The Application of Traditional Tort Theory to Embodied Machine Intelligence 52–55, in Robot 
Law (Ryan Calo, A. Michael Froomkin, Ian Kerr, eds.) (2016). Unlike Karnow, I do not agree that the relevant 
distinction between autonomous and non-autonomous machines should be the degree to which they are unpredictable. 
See id. Tort law should pursue functional solutions, and for the purposes of accident reduction it should not matter 
whether a self-driving car operates per expert rules or per unpredictable machine learning algorithms. See, Ryan 
Abbott, I Think Therefore I Invent: Creative Computers and the Future of Patent Law, 57(4) B.C.L.R 1079 (2016) 
(arguing in the patent context that it would be impossible or impractical to distinguish between different computer 
architectures for determining whether a computer qualifies as an inventor, and that the distinction is irrelevant to 
promoting innovation).  
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predictability, only on social and practical outcomes.119 It makes no difference to someone run over 
by a self-driving car what type of computer was operating the vehicle. Whether a computer acts 
according to fixed or expert rules created by a programmer or more complex machine-learning 
algorithms such as neural-networks that generate new and sometimes unforeseen behaviors, the 
physical outcome is the same.120 Leaving aside difficulties with courts attempting to distinguish 
between different types of computer architecture, ultimately, the goals of tort law should be 
functional. We should aspire to lower accident rates, not to create a formalistically pure theory of 
autonomy.  
Computer-Generated Torts as a Type of Machine Injury 
Not all machine injuries would be computer-generated torts. To illustrate, consider two 
hypothetical accidents:  
1) A crane operator drops a steel frame on a passerby after incorrectly identifying the 
location for drop off. 
2) A crane operator is manipulating a crane under normal conditions when it tips over and 
lands on a passerby.  
In the first example, as between the machine and the operator, it seems obvious (and we 
may assume) that the operator is at fault (although a creative plaintiff’s attorney might argue the 
crane was negligently designed to allow such an outcome). While the accident could not have 
occurred without the machine’s involvement, making it a factual cause of the injury in torts 
                                                 
119 Cf. e.g., David C. Vladeck, Machines Without Principals: Liability Rules and Artificial Intelligence, 89 WASH. L. 
REV. 117, 121 (2014) (arguing different liability rules may need to apply to injuries caused by computers that cannot 
be traced to a “design, manufacturing, or programming defect...”)  
120 See, e.g., Jack Balkin, The Path of Robotics Law, CAL. L. REV 45, 46 (arguing against a focus on formalism and 
essentialism in the law).  
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vernacular, the machine did not interrupt a direct and foreseeable chain of events set in motion by 
the operator’s action. The machine is essentially functioning as an extension of the operator, in the 
same way that the operator could commit a battery by throwing a rock at another person.121 In the 
second hypothetical, allocating fault is once again intuitively obvious. The machine is at fault 
rather than the operator. The operator acted with reasonable care, and the injury was due to (we 
may assume) a flawed crane. 
These two scenarios would result in very different liability outcomes. In the first, the 
operator, and possibly the operator’s employer, would be liable to the passerby in negligence 
because the operator failed to exercise reasonable care. In the second, the manufacturer and retailer 
of the crane would be strictly liable to the passerby even if the manufacturer had exercised the 
utmost care in the design and construction of the crane. 
In both scenarios, an operator is using a crane in much the same way cranes have been used 
in construction for thousands of years. Granted, today’s cranes utilize more sophisticated designs, 
are built from sturdier materials, and have electric power, but the basic dynamic between person 
and machine has not changed much. The cranes used to build skyscrapers, the pulleys used to build 
the Giza Pyramids, and the cranes used to build the Parthenon all involved human operators 
controlling the movements of a simple or complex machine to redirect and amplify force.122 
Now imagine a third scenario: 
3) An unmanned crane operated by a computer drops a steel frame on a passerby after 
incorrectly identifying the location for drop off.  
                                                 
121 See, e.g., R v Day (1845) 1 Cox 207 (holding that slashing a victim’s clothing with a knife constitutes battery).   
122 J. J. Coulton, Lifting in Early Greek Architecture, 94 The Journal of Hellenic Studies 1–19 (1974).  
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The law now treats examples 2 and 3 the same way because they both involve defective 
products. Yet in important respects, examples 1 and 3 are more closely related. Both examples 1 
and 3 involve the same sort of action and the same physical result. In example 2, a machine is 
being used as a tool. In example 3, a computer has stepped into the shoes of the worker; it has 
replaced a person, and it is performing in essentially the same manner as a person. If the computer 
were a person, the computer would be liable in negligence and held to the standard of a reasonable 
person.123  
Holding computer tortfeasors to a negligence standard requires rules for distinguishing 
between computer-generated torts and other harms. We want to distinguish between cases in which 
a machine is used as a mere instrument and a person is at fault (example 1), cases in which an 
ordinary product is at fault (example 2), and cases in which there is a “computer tortfeasor” 
(example 3).  
Computer-generated torts could be those cases in which an autonomous computer occupies 
the position of a reasonable person in the negligence calculus, and where automating promotes 
safety. We would only want to encourage automation when doing so would reduce accidents. It 
would be harmful to encourage automation while human drivers outperform self-driving cars 
(though, it might still be beneficial to encourage automation for a subset of cases, for instance, the 
class of bad drivers). To shift from strict liability to negligence, manufacturers should have the 
                                                 
123 I have previously argued for a similar rule in the intellectual property context, where I have proposed that computers 
should be recognized as authors and inventors if they independently perform creative acts. Ryan Abbott, I Think 
Therefore I Invent: Creative Computers and the Future of Patent Law, 57(4) B.C.L.R 1079 (2016); Ryan Abbott, Hal 
the Inventor: Big Data and Its Use by Artificial Intelligence, in BIG DATA IS NOT A MONOLITH (Cassidy R. Sugimoto, 
Hamid R. Ekbia & Michael Mattioli eds., 2016). This rule would generate innovation by creating financial incentives 
for developing creative computers. Id. 
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burden to show by a preponderance of evidence that a computer tortfeasor is safer on average than 
a person. 
Implementation 
Automation may occur on a more or less permanent basis or it may be situational. For 
example, an autonomous vehicle may only permit a machine driver, or it may allow a person to 
switch between human and machine control. Where automation is all-or-nothing, the relevant 
inquiry should be whether a specific instance of automation would be expected to result in a net 
reduction in accidents, rather than to reduce the risk of the specific harm that occurred. For 
instance, if self-driving cars were better than people at avoiding collisions with other vehicles, but 
worse at avoiding collisions specifically with white cars, a computer driver might decrease the 
overall risk of accidents but increase the risk of colliding with white cars. In a case involving a 
collision with a white car, a negligence standard should still apply. Better that there should be more 
collisions with white cars so long as there are fewer collisions in total (if collisions with white cars 
do not result in disproportionate harm).  
Even where automation is situational, it makes sense to apply negligence. Hypothetically, if 
a self-driving car is on average ten times safer than a person, but only half as safe as a person in 
rainy conditions, a person should rely on autonomous driving software most of the time but operate 
the vehicle conventionally in the rain. If someone instead uses self-driving software in the rain, the 
computer should still be evaluated under a negligence standard. It may be difficult for a user to 
know in advance what circumstances an autonomous computer is likely to encounter as well as 
when an autonomous computer will outperform a person. In addition, the manufacturer—as the 
liable party—is unlikely to have input into how its computers are used situationally. Manufacturers 
could utilize non-tort mechanisms to prevent unsafe uses, such as by warning users that self-driving 
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cars may not be operated in the rain, or by building in technological safeguards to prevent self-
driving cars from operating in the rain. If self-driving cars prove to be less safe than human drivers 
in the rain, it is likely manufacturers would still be liable for accidents in negligence.  
Similarly, software used to diagnose disease based on medical imaging may outperform 
physicians generally, but underperform at detecting certain diseases. Ideally, this might result in 
human/machine collaborative review of imaging. If a machine were to underperform detecting lung 
cancer, for example, it should still be evaluated in negligence for its failures. The computer will 
likely be liable if a physician should have detected the lung cancer. In instances where a computer 
is generally safer than a person, but underperforms in a certain area, it is still likely to be liable in 
negligence when underperforming. This retains the ex ante incentive to improve an autonomous 
computer to reduce accidents, and allows victims to be compensated.  
The basic inquiry about automation safety should focus on whether automation reduces, or 
is expected to reduce, overall accidents, not whether it did in fact reduce accidents in a specific 
instance. If Tesla can prove that it is more likely than not its self-driving cars are safer overall than 
human drivers, this should be sufficient to shift to negligence even in a case where a particular 
substitution of a human driver with a self-driving car results in more accidents. Better that there 
should be fewer accidents in total even if one normal self-driving car gets in more accidents than 
the class average.  
This new standard might sometimes involve complex problems of proof. A manufacturer 
would have the initial burden to prove its computers are safer than people, understanding that 
creates an incentive to misrepresent a computer’s safety.124 Even when manufacturers are acting in 
                                                 
124 Ryan Abbott, Big Data and Pharmacovigilance, Using Health Information Exchanges to Revolutionize Drug Safety, 
95 IOWA L. REV, 225, 232–237 (2013) (discussing differences between pre- and post-market data for evaluating safety 
in the pharmaceutical context, and the incentive on manufacturers to misrepresent safety profiles).  
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good faith, it may be difficult to determine whether a computer is safer than a person. Research 
conducted to the highest scientific standards sometimes fails to accurately predict real world 
outcomes.125 It may be that Tesla has reason to believe its self-driving cars are significantly safer 
than human drivers, but that once its cars enter the marketplace, they fail meet expectations. For 
instance, Tesla’s research might fail to consider the reactions of drivers in states other than 
California to self-driving vehicles.126 In practice, automation may turn out to be safer or more 
dangerous, than initially predicted. Decisions often must be made based on incomplete information, 
and waiting for perfect knowledge risks sacrificing probable benefits at the altar of precaution.127 
Adversarial legal proceedings are well-suited for resolving such factual issues, and 
plaintiffs could challenge manufacturer claims of safety.128 Thus, if Tesla presents proof its 
vehicles were predicted to cause a fatality every 200 million miles, but plaintiffs’ proof shows that 
Tesla’s self-driving vehicles actually caused a fatality every 50 million miles, that should shift the 
liability standard back to strict liability. It is worth noting that post-market data is not always 
                                                 
125 Id. 
126 For example, although Google’s self-driving vehicles have caused accidents, nearly all accidents involving these 
vehicles have been the fault of human drivers. Chris Ziegler, A Google Self-Driving Car Caused a Crash for the First 
Time, Feb. 29, 2016, The Verge, http://www.theverge.com/2016/2/29/11134344/google-self-driving-car-crash-report. 
Monthly reports of accidents involving self-driving cars is available at, Google, Google Self-Driving Car Project, 
https://www.google.com/selfdrivingcar/reports/.  
127 Ryan Abbott and Ian Ayres, Evidence and Extrapolation: Mechanisms for Regulating Off-Label Uses of Drugs and 
Devices, 64(3) DUKE. L.J. 380 (2014).  
128 See, Ryan Abbott, Big Data and Pharmacovigilance, Using Health Information Exchanges to Revolutionize Drug 
Safety, 95 IOWA L. REV., 225, 266 (2013) (discussing benefits of adversarial dispute resolution). Alternately, 
manufacturers could have a duty to evaluate the safety of automation technologies before sale, and an ongoing duty to 
monitor their post-market performance. This could mean that instead of plaintiffs and defendants engaging in a “battle 
of the experts” focused on objective safety outcomes, it would be sufficient for negligence that a manufacturer believed 
in good faith that its computers were safe. Plaintiffs could only rebut the presumption that a manufacturer acted in good 
faith. Thus, Tesla would remain liable in negligence if it could prove its vehicles were predicted to cause a fatality 
every 200 million miles, but plaintiffs could prove that Tesla’s self-driving vehicles actually caused a fatality every 50 
million miles. Unless plaintiffs could prove Tesla knew or should have known that its initial predictions were not 
accurate or that Tesla failed to monitor the performance of its cars. But this would create a greater risk that 
manufactures would fail to aggressively monitor, or that manufacturers would fail to monitor appropriately despite 
their best efforts. Better to base the standard on objective evidence of safety than a manufacturer’s subjective 
knowledge. Better also to empower plaintiffs’ attorneys to hold manufacturers to account than to put foxes in charge of 
guarding henhouses. 
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superior to pre-market data in every instance; sometimes pre-market data may be more predictive 
of future outcomes, particularly where post-market data is limited or skewed.129  
It should not be necessary for a computer tortfeasor to physically replace a human operator 
in order for negligence to apply. It should be sufficient that a computer is performing a task which 
a person could reasonably do. For example, if a new taxi company goes into business using a fleet 
of only self-driving vehicles, computers would not have replaced human operators, but they would 
be doing work that human drivers could have done. By contrast, the portions of the taxis other than 
the self-driving software, e.g., the engine, could not be reasonably substituted. A person could 
drive a taxi instead of a computer, but a person could not reasonably replace the entire vehicle. So, 
the software operating the self-driving taxi could qualify as a computer tortfeasor, but not the other 
parts of the vehicle.  
Once a manufacturer establishes that a computer tortfeasor is safer than a person, the 
negligence test should focus on whether the computer’s act was negligent, rather than whether the 
computer was negligently designed or marketed. Again, the computer is taking the place of a 
person in the traditional negligence paradigm, and this would treat the computer more like a person 
than a product.130 It makes no difference to an accident victim what a computer was “thinking,” 
only how the computer acted.131 Accident victims have a right to demand careful conduct 
regardless of how well a computer tortfeasor may have been designed.132  
                                                 
129 Ryan Abbott, The Sentinel Initiative as a Cultural Commons, in GOVERNING MEDICAL RESEARCH COMMONS 
(Katherine Strandburg, et al., eds.) 27–30 (forthcoming) (discussing difficulties with using real world data to predict 
safety outcomes in an example using the medication Dabigatran).  
130 To appropriate terminology used in the context of criminal law.  
See, e.g., Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co.,11 Ex. 781, 156 Eng. Rep. 1047 (Exch. 1856). 
131 To appropriate criminal law terminology, we are interested in the actus rea rather than the mens rea. Dennis J 
Baker, GLANVILLE WILLIAMS TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 167 (2012). There is no benefit to punishing computer 
tortfeasors for wrongful actions, even under civil law.  
132 See, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr, Lecture 3 of THE COMMON LAW, available in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF 
JUSTICE HOLMES 154 (Sheldon M. Novick ed., 1995). 
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Applying the above rules to the crane example, Example 1 would result in human liability 
because the human operator acted carelessly, and the crane did not interrupt a foreseeable chain of 
events. It would retain strict manufacturer liability for Example 2, because a person could not 
reasonably be substituted for a crane. It would permit negligent manufacturer liability for Example 
3 (because the computer was automating a task which a person could have performed), but only if 
the computer tortfeasor is safer than a human operator.  
In the context of automated driving, human drivers would be liable for harms they cause 
because of their own driving decisions, a manufacturer would be strictly liable for harms caused by 
defective machines that are not automating human functions (as would be the case for 
MacPherson’s Buick), but manufacturers would be liable in negligence rather than strict liability 
for errors made by autonomous driving software if the software were proven safer than a person.  
Financial Liability 
Autonomy exists on a continuum. In practice, the divide between an ordinary product and 
an autonomous computer may not be clear cut. In the self-driving car context, for example, under 
one widely adopted framework, vehicles are categorized on a zero to five scale based on “who does 
what, when.”133 At level 0, the human driver does everything; at level 5, the vehicle can perform all 
driving tasks under all conditions that a human driver could perform. In between, there are various 
degrees of assistance, control, and interaction between person and machine. When computers and 
people share decision making, traditional principles of joint and several liability should apply.134  
For instance, where a human driver and a computer driver are both at fault, as may have been the 
                                                 
133 See, SAE International, Automated Driving (2014) available at: www.sae.org/misc/pdfs/automated_driving.pdf 
(describing the SAE taxonomy).  
134 See generally, Richard W. Wright, The Logic and Fairness of Joint and Several Liability, MEM. ST. UL REV. 23, 45 
(1992). 
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case where Tesla’s system failed to detect a truck and the human driver was watching a movie, 
both drivers could be liable for either the entire injury, or in proportion to their wrongdoing.135 
Whether in strict liability or negligence, computers could not be financially liable for their 
harms. Computers do not have property rights, are owned as chattel, and would not be influenced 
by the specter of liability in the way a person might be influenced. For the purposes of financial 
liability, the computer’s manufacturer and other members of the supply chain should still be 
responsible for satisfying judgments under standard principles of product liability law.  Product 
liability law already has rules for allocating liability in complex cases where several parties 
contribute to the design and production of an ordinary product, or where several parties are 
involved in the distribution chain. Those rules could apply in a case in which Apple and Delphi 
jointly design self-driving car software, which General Motors licenses and incorporates in its 
vehicles, which vehicles are then leased by an independent retailer to Lyft. Common law liability 
rules could be altered by firms in the supply chain. That would be particularly likely to occur where 
manufacturers and retailers are large, sophisticated entities. For example, General Motors might 
indemnify Apple, Delphi, and Lyft in return for more favorable licensing and leasing terms.  
Alternately, the computer’s owner could be liable for its harms. That would be somewhat 
akin to treating computer tortfeasors as employees and making owners liable under theories of 
vicarious liability.136 It is particularly easy to imagine owners purchasing insurance for harms 
caused by autonomous computers in the self-driving car context, where insurance policies may 
soon come with a rider (or discount) for autonomous software. Owner liability might further 
incentivize the production of autonomous computers given that manufacturers would have less 
liability, but it might reduce adoption since owners would be taking on that liability. These two 
                                                 
135 Id. 
136 See generally, Fleming James Jr., Vicarious Liability, 28 Tul. L. Rev. 161 (1953). 
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effects might offset each other if reduced manufacturer liability were to result in lower purchase 
prices. Ultimately, owner liability is not an ideal solution because owners may be the most likely 
victims of computer tortfeasors, and because manufacturers are in the best position to improve 
product safety and to weigh the risks and benefits of new technologies.  
In practice, the economic impact of different liability standards for accidents by self-driving 
cars will be seen in the cost of insurance. Insurers base their premiums on risk, and once self-
driving cars become significantly safer than human drivers, insurance rates will decrease for self-
driving cars and perhaps increase for human drivers. This should have a nudging effect on self-
driving car adoption, as financially sensitive individuals take auto premiums into account in 
deciding whether to drive. To the extent self-driving cars are judged under a more lenient 
negligence standard we would expect lower premiums for self-driving cars, further incentivizing 
their adoption. If manufacturers and retailers rather than car owners are held responsible for 
accidents, the burden of insurance would shift from owners to manufacturers, although this cost 
may then be reflected in higher car purchase prices.  
Alternatives to Negligence  
Shifting from strict liability to negligence is not the only means of encouraging automation. 
The government could provide a variety of financial incentives to manufacturers and retailers to 
promote the creation and sale of safer technologies. In other contexts, government incentives have 
been effective at promoting innovation.137 For example, incentives could take the form of grants for 
                                                 
137 See generally, Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive System?, in 
2 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 51 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2002). 
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research and development,138 loans to build production facilities,139 enhanced intellectual property 
rights,140 prizes,141 preferential tax treatments,142 or government guarantees.143 
The government could even provide credits to consumers to purchase self-driving cars. This 
could be modeled after the Car Allowance Rebate System (CARS), better known as “cash for 
clunkers.”144 CARS provided consumers trading in old vehicles with vouchers of between $3,500 
to $4,500 to purchase new cars.145 It was a $3 billion U.S. federal program designed as a short term 
economic stimulus and to benefit U.S. auto manufacturers. It was also intended to promote safer, 
cleaner, more fuel-efficient vehicles. Ultimately, while critics dispute the effectiveness of the 
program at stimulating the economy and promoting domestically produced automobiles, it did 
succeed at improving fuel-efficiency and safety, and it was popular with consumers.146 In a similar 
                                                 
138 See, e.g., Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patent-Prizes Debate, Tex. L. R., 303–321 
(discussing the role of government grants in innovation policy). “Today, direct federal R&D spending (which includes 
the very small amount currently spent on prizes) is about $130–$140 billion per year—slightly more than half of which 
is defense- related. Many states also provide direct R&D support: in fiscal year 2009, states spent $3.6 billion on 
support for R&D at state universities and another $1.3 billion on other grants and facilities for in-state research.” Id. 
139 See, e.g., Special Reports, Solyndra Scandal, Washington Post, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/specialreports/solyndra-scandal/ (providing background information on the 
billions in unexpected costs to taxpayers from controversial loans defaulted on by green technology programs). 
140 See, e.g., Ryan Abbott, Treating the Health Care Crisis: Complementary and Alternative Medicine for PPACA, 14 
DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 62–98 (2012) (noting that pharmaceutical manufacturers can receive market exclusivity, 
extended patent terms, or even sui generis forms of intellectual property protection for preferred technologies). 
141 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Intellectual Property: The Law and Economics Approach, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 57, 58–
59 (2005) 
142 See, e.g., Nick Bloom et al., Do R&D Tax Credits Work? Evidence from a Panel of Countries, 1979–1997, 85 J. 
PUB. ECON. 1 (2002); Bronwyn Hall & John Van Reenen, How Effective Are Fiscal Incentives for R&D? A Review of 
the Evidence, 29 RES. POL’Y 449 (2000).  
143 See, e.g, Gunhild Berg and Michael J. Fuchs. "Bank financing of SMEs in five Sub-Saharan African countries: the 
role of competition, innovation, and the government." World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 6563 (2013). 
144 U.S. Department of Transportation, Car Allowance Rebate System, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20091226080857/http://www.cars.gov/ 
145 Id.  
146 The Department of Transportation reported the program was successful at boosting economic growth and creating 
jobs. U.S. Department of Transportation, Cash for Clunkers Wraps up with Nearly 700,000 car sales and increased 
fuel efficiency, U.S. Transportation Secretary LaHood declares program "wildly successful" (Press release), Aug. 26, 
2009, available at http://www.nhtsa.gov/About-NHTSA/Press-Releases/2009/Cash-for-Clunkers-Wraps-up-with-
Nearly-700,000-car-sales-and-increased-fuel-efficiency,-U.S.-Transportation-Secretary-LaHood-declares-program-
“wildly-successful”. Others were less bullish. One study found that the total costs of the program outweighed the 
benefits by $1.4 billion. Burton A. Abrams and George R. Parsons, Is CARS a Clunker?, The Economists' Voice 6 (8) 
(August 2009). Another study argued that the program increased short term spending, but decreased overall spending 
on new cars. Mark Hoekstra, Steven L. Puller, and Jeremy West, Cash for Corollas: When Stimulus Reduces Spending, 
NBER Working Paper No. 20349, Jul. 2014, available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w20349.pdf. With regards to fuel 
efficiency, one study found that the program improved the average fuel economy of all vehicles purchased by 0.6 mpg 
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manner, consumers trading in conventional vehicles could be provided with a voucher to purchase 
self-driving cars.  
Even if incentives are limited to tort liability, there are still alternatives to shifting to 
negligence. For example, manufactures could have their liability limited through state or federal 
tort reform acts that might place caps on damages, limit contingency fees, eliminate joint-and-
several liability, mandate periodic payments, or reduce the statute of limitations.147  
Finally, the government could promote safety by means of regulation. This could involve 
requirements for industries to achieve minimum safety targets, or direct requirements to adopt 
certain technologies.148 At the point where self-driving cars become ten or a hundred times safer 
than human drivers, non-autonomous driving could be prohibited.149 Regulatory solutions may be 
most appropriate where the benefits of automation are overwhelming, and where it is undisputed 
that automation would result in massive safety gains.  
Yet there is reason to think that shifting to negligence may be a preferred mechanism. It is 
both a consumer and business friendly solution. While consumers would have more difficulty 
seeking to recover for accidents, the risk of accidents would be reduced. Most consumers would 
probably prefer to avoid harm rather than to improve their odds of receiving compensation. For 
businesses, it would lower costs associated with liability (which may also result in lower consumer 
                                                 
in July, 2009, and by 0.7 mpg in August 2009. Michael Sivak and Brandon Schoettle, The Effect of the "Cash for 
Clunkers" Program on the Overall Fuel Economy of Purchased New Vehicles, Report No. UMTRI-2009-34, 
Transportation Research Institute at the University of Michigan, available at: 
http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/64025/1/102323.pdf. 
147 These are some of the reforms created by the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA) of 1975 enacted 
by the California legislature to lower medical malpractice liability insurance premiums. Cal. Civ. Code Sections 3333–
3343.7. 
148 See generally, Health and Safety Executive, A guide to health and safety regulation in Great Britain 11, available at 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/hse49.pdf (outlining the occupational health and safety system in Great Britain and the 
various types of safety standards imposed on businesses).  
149 Stuart Dredge, Elon Musk: Self-Driving Cars Could Lead to Ban on Human Drivers, The Guardian, Mar. 18, 2016, 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/mar/18/elon-musk-self-driving-cars-ban-human-drivers 
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prices). Shifting to negligence would not require government funding, additional regulatory 
burdens on industry, or new administrative responsibilities. Additionally, it is an incremental 
solution that relies on existing mechanisms for distributing liability, and builds upon the 
established common law. There may be less risk that shifting to negligence would produce 
unexpected outcomes than more radical solutions.150 For all the above reasons, shifting to 
negligence should be a politically feasible solution.  
Ultimately, to the extent that policy makers agree that automation should be promoted when 
it improves safety, there is no need to rely on a single mechanism. Negligence shifting could 
operate alongside government grants for R&D and consumer credits, combined with direct 
regulations in certain instances.  
Shifting to negligence could be accomplished through legislation or judicial activism. 
Legislative implementation may be preferable because it would be faster than waiting on courts, 
and legislatures may be better suited for establishing public policy.151 Indeed, automation to 
improve public safety is precisely the sort of activity that lawmakers should facilitate because it 
benefits the general welfare. If legislatures fail to act, courts could independently adopt these rules. 
Lawmakers would then have the option of modifying the common law.  
IV. THE REASONABLE ROBOT 
If a man is born hasty and awkward, is always having accidents and hurting himself 
or his neighbors, no doubt his congenital defects will be allowed for in the courts of 
                                                 
150 Indeed, some critics argued that CARS primarily subsidized Japanese auto manufacturers, while a similar Japanese 
stimulus program excluded American auto manufacturers. John Crawley, Japanese, Koreans gain most from cash for 
clunkers, Reuters, Aug. 26, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/retire-us-usa-clunkers-sales-
idUSTRE57P5C220090826; Douglas Stanglin, U.S. cars excluded from Japan's cash-for-clunkers program, USA 
Today, Dec. 11, 2009, http://content.usatoday.com/communities/ondeadline/post/2009/12/us-cars-excluded-from-
japans-cash-for-clunkers-program-/1#.WDwOQXfc-t8.  
151 See, e.g., Matthew U. Scherer, Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks, Challenges, Competencies and 
Strategies, 29 (2) Harv. J. L. & Tech. 354, 389-390 (2016) (discussing the reactionary nature of court proceedings); see 
also, Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 524 (1959) (“[p]olicy decisions are for the… legislature...”). 
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Heaven, but his slips are no less troublesome to his neighbors than if they sprang 
from guilty neglect.152 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 
When Negligence is Strict 
Negligence may function almost like strict liability for people with below average abilities. 
Individuals with special challenges and disabilities may not be capable of always exercising 
ordinary prudence, and may be unable to maintain “a certain average of conduct.”153 This issue was 
at the heart of Vaughan v. Menlove in 1837 which concerned a defendant who lacked normal 
intelligence.154 It was argued that it would thus be unfair to hold him to the standard of an ordinary 
person, and that he should instead be held to the standard of a person with below average 
intelligence. The court disagreed, holding that ordinary prudence should apply in every case of 
negligence.155 As Oliver Wendell Holmes articulated in 1881, “the law considers… what would be 
blameworthy in the average man, the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence, and determines 
liability by that. If we fall below the level in those gifts, it is our misfortune.” That remains the case 
today; a modern defendant cannot generally escape liability for causing a motor vehicle accident 
because they have slow reflexes, poor vision, or anxiety while driving. 
There are benefits to such a rule. Logistically, as Justice Tindal noted in Vaughan, it is 
difficult to take individual peculiarities into account and to determine a defendant’s actual mental 
state.156 Better for administrative purposes to work with an external, objective standard than to 
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prove individual capacities and state of mind. Substantively, the rule reinforces social norms, 
creates greater deterrent pressure, and strengthens each person’s right to demand normal conduct of 
others.157 As Holmes articulated, damages caused by individuals with reduced capabilities are no 
less burdensome than those caused by ordinary people. This rule thus benefits the general welfare, 
but at the cost of telling some individuals that their best is not good enough. Those with diminished 
capabilities drive at their own peril, or else “should perhaps refrain from driving at all...”158 
The New Hasty and Awkward 
Collectively, people are not the best drivers, even when they refrain from drinking behind 
the wheel,159 falling asleep on the highway,160 or colliding into police cars while playing Pokémon 
Go.161 But compared to computers? It will not be long until computers are safer than the average 
person, and then safer than any human driver. Principles of harm avoidance suggest that once it 
becomes practical to automate, and that doing so is safer, a computer should become the new 
“reasonable person” or standard of care.  
In practice, this would mean that instead of judging a defendant’s action against what a 
reasonable person would have done, the defendant would be judged against what a computer would 
have done. For instance, today a defendant might not be liable for striking a child running in front 
of their car if a reasonable driver would not have been able to stop immediately. But they would 
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soon be liable under the exact same circumstances if an automated car would have prevented the 
injury. In fact, it may be that the automated vehicle is only able to prevent such an accident because 
it has superhuman abilities. It may have software capable of ultra-fast decision making, monitors 
that surpass human senses, and access to external cameras that expand peripheral view beyond that 
of a person.  
With the reasonable person test, jurors are asked to put themselves in the shoes of a 
reasonable person and decide what that person would have done. It may be a challenge for a juror 
to follow that reasoning in the case of a reasonable computer (or reasonable robot or machine). 
However, the reasonable computer is a far less nebulous and fictional concept than the reasonable 
person. The term “reasonable” in the context of a computer would be an anthropomorphism to 
assist people conceptually. In fact, computers largely function according to fixed rules which—
when all goes well—result in foreseeable behavior.162 Even those computers which can generate 
unpredictable behavior are still likely to be more predictable than people, particularly where such 
machines have been found to improve safety. It should be more or less possible to determine what a 
computer would have done in a particular situation.  
To take a simple case, imagine an individual driving on dry pavement at 40 mph colliding 
with a child running into the road 150 feet ahead of the driver’s vehicle.163 To determine whether 
the driver is liable under the reasonable computer standard, a jury could be presented with evidence 
that when a child runs in front of the same make and model of car being operated by automated 
software under the same conditions, the vehicle stops in about 100 feet.  Because the reasonable 
computer would not have collided with the child, the human driver would be liable. Juries would 
                                                 
162 Thomas A. Peters, COMPUTERIZED MONITORING AND ONLINE PRIVACY 97 (2016). Malfunctioning computers would 
not be “reasonable” computers. 
163 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Safety in Numbers (August 2015), available at: 
www.nhtsa.gov/nhtsa/Safety1nNum3ers/august2015/S1N_Aug15_Speeding_1.html. 
 
41 
not need to take distraction into account, the reaction time of self-driving software would be 
known, and the breaking distance could be standardized if the driver’s vehicle could not directly be 
compared because was not a vehicle type operated by self-driving software. Even in more complex 
cases, it should be easier to predict how a computer would have behaved than a person because 
computers are more predictable. Thus, it is possible to have a more objective test for the reasonable 
computer than for the reasonable person.   
A defendant might argue that it is unfair for their best efforts to result in liability. A 
computer standard of care essentially makes people strictly liable for their accidental harms. That is 
the case now for below-average drivers, and the underlying rationale for the rule will not change 
when an above-average human driver becomes a below-average driver due to computers. It may 
appear unfair to impose liability on human drivers for doing their best, but it would be more unfair 
to prevent accident victims from recovering for harms that would have been avoided had a robot 
been driving. It does not matter to an accident victim whether they were run over by a person or a 
computer.  
Tort liability would not prohibit people from driving even at the point where computers 
become substantially safer than people.  If that were a desired outcome it could be accomplished 
through command-and-control legislation.164 Instead, a computer standard of care would mean that 
people drive at their own risk. If a driver causes an accident, he or she will be liable for the 
resultant damages. A tort-based incentive may be superior to an inflexible statutory mandate 
because there may be benefits to human driving unrelated to accidents, for instance promoting 
freedom and autonomy. Individuals who particularly value their freedom may still choose to drive 
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and accept the consequences of their accidents.  
While not outright prohibiting activities, a computer standard of care is likely to have a 
significant impact on behavior. Making individuals and businesses essentially strictly liable for 
their harms will strongly discourage certain undertakings. In the self-driving car context, it would 
likely result in far fewer human drivers as insurance rates for traditional vehicles become 
prohibitively expensive relative to self-driving cars.   
A rule requiring automation at the time it first becomes available would be too harsh. 
Automatons may be prohibitively expensive or only available in limited quantities. That is 
particularly likely early in a technology’s lifecycle. It would be unfair to penalize people for not 
automating when doing so would be impossible or impractical. Therefore, to introduce a computer 
standard of care, a plaintiff should have to show by a preponderance of the evidence that a person 
was performing a task that could be performed by a computer and that it would have been 
practicable for the defendant to automate. This means that a defendant would not be judged against 
the standard of a computer operator where 1) no such operator existed at the time of the accident, 
2) no computer operator was available to the defendant, 3) a computer operator was prohibitively 
expensive, or 4) there were other overriding interests for not automating (e.g., regulatory 
requirements for a human operator). If Tesla could manufacturer a completely safe autonomous 
vehicle but at a cost of $1 million dollars, it would not be reasonable to require consumers to 
automate. 
Reasonable People Use Autonomous Computers 
  As an alternative to the reasonable computer standard, the reasonable person could be 
someone using an autonomous computer. For example, once self-driving cars become safer than 
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people, a jury might find that it is unreasonable to drive yourself rather than to use a self-driving 
car. Applying the “reasonable person using an autonomous computer” to the earlier hypothetical 
involving a child running into the street, the human driver’s negligence would not be based on 
failing to stop in 100 feet as a self-driving car would have, rather, liability would be based on his 
driving in the first place. A reasonable person would not have driven.  
  Under either the reasonable person or reasonable computer standard, a human driver would 
be compared with a self-driving car, but in different ways. With the reasonable computer standard, 
we would evaluate the human driver’s proximally harmful act, whereas with the reasonable person 
standard, we would evaluate the human driver’s a priori decision to automate (a bad decision 
would then be considered the harmful act). Maintaining the reasonable person standard would be 
more in line with the existing negligence regime, and it would be a less radical way to accomplish 
the goal of incentivizing automation to improve safety. 
But while keeping the reasonable person standard would be conceptually easier, in practice 
it would be less desirable. We want to compare the harmful act of the person and computer, not 
target the initial decision to automate. It is problematic to base liability on the decision to automate 
because it either must focus on the question of whether automation is generally or situationally 
beneficial. A general focus fails to consider instances in which a person will outperform a machine. 
A situational focus must still compare the harmful act of a person versus a computer.  
It is likely that as autonomous computers are introduced, they will be safer at automating 
certain activities than others. For instance, automated computers working to diagnose disease may 
be superior to physicians at detecting certain conditions, but not others. Self-driving cars may be 
safer than human drivers on average, but not safer than professional or above average drivers. 
Autonomous vehicles may also be safer under most conditions, but might be relatively poor at, for 
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example, driving off road. So, while automation may generally improve safety, optimal accident 
reduction may require a mix of computer and human activity.  
Suppose a self-driving car is ten times safer than a human driver generally, but only half as 
safe as a human driver in icy conditions. Now suppose a human driver encounters a patch of ‘black 
ice’ and causes an accident under circumstances in which she would not be negligent by 
comparison to a reasonable human driver. If we were to hold her to the standard of a reasonable 
computer, she would escape liability if the computer would have been unable to avoid the accident 
(which is likely if the computer is half as safe in icy conditions). However, if the reasonable person 
using an autonomous computer test focuses on whether an autonomous computer is generally safer, 
she would be liable. That test would conclude that it would have been unreasonable not to use a 
self-driving car since self-driving cars are generally safer. This would penalize human action even 
when it would be preferred.  
Alternately, the reasonable person using an autonomous computer evaluation could be 
situational. For instance, it could be reasonable not to use an autonomous computer only in icy 
conditions. But this is just a more convoluted version of the reasonable computer test, because it 
requires evaluating whether a computer would be safer than a person in a particular instance. That 
essentially asks how the computer would have acted in a situation—which is the reasonable 
computer standard. It would then require asking, based on that knowledge, which might be 
impractical for a person to have, whether automating was reasonable. On top of that, it presupposes 
the ability to activate and deactivate automation as needed. In the black ice hypothetical, it could 
require the driver to know in advance of activating self-driving software whether there were icy 
conditions and how the computer would perform in icy conditions. It might require the driver to 
activate or deactivate automation only during icy conditions, or to understand whether the risk of 
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using the computer in icy conditions outweighed the benefits of using the computer for other parts 
of the trip.  
The Reasonable Computer Standard for Computer Tortfeasors 
This Article has proposed holding computer tortfeasors to a negligence standard and 
comparing their acts to the acts of a reasonable person, after technology has advanced to the point 
that computers have been proven safer than people. It has also proposed replacing the reasonable 
person standard with the reasonable computer standard, again, once this point has been reached. 
This means that computer tortfeasors would be held to the reasonable computer standard.  
There may be instances in which it still makes sense to apply the reasonable person 
standard to computer tortfeasors. As described above, there will be cases in which a human 
defendant would not be judged against the standard of a computer, for instance, where automation 
is prohibitively expense or where computer operators are not widely available. We would not want 
to hold a computer tortfeasor to a higher standard than a human defendant. In some industries, it 
may take decades after the introduction of autonomous technologies for the use of such 
technologies to become customary, or to meet the criteria proposed earlier for adopting the 
reasonable computer standard.165 
Eventually, once a computer becomes the standard of care, it would also be the standard for 
computer tortfeasors. For instance, if a self-driving Audi collided with a child running in front of 
the vehicle, the negligence test could take into account the stopping times of self-driving Google 
cars. There are a variety of ways to determine the reasonable computer standard, for example, 
considering the industry customary, average, or safest technology. Under any standard, this is a 
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different test than the current strict liability standard, in which the inquiry focuses on whether a 
product was defectively designed or its properties falsely represented. 
As computers improve, the reasonable computer standard would grow stricter. That is 
alright, because once the reasonable computer is exponentially safer than a person, it is likely that 
computer tortfeasors will rarely cause accidents. At that point, the economic impact of tort liability 
on automation adoption may be slight, and the primary effect of the reasonable computer standard 
would be to internalize the cost of accidents on human tortfeasors. For certain types of automation, 
it may take a lifetime until computers are exponentially safer than people.  
The Automation Problem 
The impact of automation goes far beyond accident reduction. Just focusing on autonomous 
vehicles, the widespread adoption of this technology could have revolutionary benefits. It will 
allow people to be more productive and mobile, and it will reduce emissions and congestion.166 
One autonomous vehicle could replace up to 12 normal cars.167 Given that the average automobile 
spends about 95 percent of its time sitting in place, self-driving cars may also eliminate the need 
for parking.168 Getting rid of parking just in the U.S. would free up space the size of Connecticut, 
and could allow redesigned pedestrian-friendly urban areas.169 Automation will increase freedom 
for the disabled, blind, and unlicensed. It might eliminate traffic lights and the need for private car 
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ownership.170 The net result of self-driving cars could be substantial environmental, economic and 
social benefits.171 
Driverless technologies may also result in the displacement of human workers, increased 
unemployment, greater wealth disparities, and a reduction of the tax base. Automation threatens the 
jobs of truck, bus, and taxi drivers who collectively make up about three percent of the working 
population.172 In other industries, automation has resulted in reduced workforces. 173 For instance, 
employment at computer and electronic companies decreased 45 percent from 2001 to 2016.174 
Employment at semiconductor makers decreased by half during the same period.175  
These are all important issues to consider in formulating automation policies, but tort law 
may not be the best mechanism to address these broader concerns.176 Ultimately, tort liability alone 
will not determine whether automation occurs. Consumer demand and the economics of 
automation will bring about increasing automation in the absence of laws prohibiting it.177 Tesla, 
for example, is planning to make all its cars self-driving, and Tesla is far from alone in automating 
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vehicles.178179 Billions of dollars have been invested in self-driving technologies by at least 33 
corporations including Apple, Google, General Motors and Uber.180  
Concluding Thoughts 
In the coming decades, as people and machines compete in an expanding array of activities, 
it is vital that appropriate legal and policy frameworks be put in place to guide the development of 
technology and to ensure its widespread benefits.181 It is particularly important that tort liability be 
structured to optimize accident deterrence. 
Technological advances present new challenges to existing frameworks. At some point in 
the future, there are likely to be few or no activities for which computers cannot outperform 
people.182 Self-driving cars will eventually be a thousand times safer than the best human driver.183 
At some point, computers will cause so little harm that the economics of negligence versus strict 
liability will be irrelevant. Autonomous computers will have become so ubiquitous that the 
constantly improving reasonable computer should be the benchmark for most or all areas of 
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accident law. In fact, autonomous computers are likely to become so safe that regulatory mandates 
for automation will be desirable. 
In the meantime, creating incentives for developing and adopting safer technologies could 
prevent countless accidents. It has become acceptable for more than a million people a year to die 
in traffic accidents worldwide, but only because there has not been a reasonable alternative until 
now.184 We could soon be living in a world where no one dies from unintended injury, or from 
medical error for that matter. Once the third and fourth leading causes of death are eliminated, that 
would just leave us to deal with the leading two causes of death: cardiovascular disease and cancer. 
Automation may eliminate those as well.185 
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